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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 55 
Accident time: 08:50 Accident Date: 21/10/1997 
Where it occurred: Luena/Lucusse road, 
Moxico Province 
Country: Angola 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 07/11/1997 
ID original source: GP/JJ/GI Name of source: INAROEE 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: Type 72 AP blast Ground condition: hard 
route (verge) 
Date record created: 23/01/2004 Date  last modified: 17/03/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: Leua Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet: 219 
Map name: 1:100 000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inadequate communications (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
metal-detector not used (?) 




The demining group appear to have been operating in two-man teams at the time but the 
accident report implies that both team members were working simultaneously. 
An undated report of a country MAC board of inquiry was made available and the following 
summarises its content.  
The investigators visited the site on 4th November 1997 and found the deminers clearing a 2m 
wide verge on both sides of the road. They observed that the deminers were clearing without 
using marking sticks and at a distance of only 6 metres apart. The victim and his partner 
began work at 07:30. By 08.50 they had cleared 502 metres. Both men wore frag-jackets, 
helmet and visor. The victim was clearing by using his prodder. He was called to help his 
Section Leader remove grass from a large pothole in the road. As he returned at 08:50 he 
stepped on "a mine he had previously missed". No fragments of the device were found and 
the mine identification relied on inference from the damage inflicted. No record of the time 
taken for medical treatment was made. 
Communications within the demining team by UHF handsets was unreliable. They were 
unable to report the accident until the victim had travelled 34k towards the "Operations 
Room". 
The victim and his partner stated that the Section Leader had told them to stop using the 
detector. "Faced with the inability to prod correctly" they argued but were overruled. The 
Section Leader said there were no mines and they must work quicker. When they ran out of 
marking sticks, he told them to keep working. They said the Section Leader had left to spend 
20 minutes drinking "Hidromel" (fermented honey alcohol). 
The Section Leader denied the victim and his partner's statement. He could not remember 
the number of deminers under his control, what time they had started work or the amount of 
area cleared. [The investigation took place two weeks after the accident.] He claimed to be 
unaware that the deminers were clearing a 2m wide lane without markers despite being only 
2m from them. He also claimed to have completed the demining group's Section Leader's 
course but the group denied holding any such courses. 
The Team Supervisor stated that he was warned the Section Leader about drinking 
previously. 
The paramedic acknowledged that he was poorly equipped and stated that he had asked for 
better provisions in writing twice following the accident. He had not received special trauma 
training. When questioned about the content of his First Aid bag it contained a single used 
pair of surgical gloves, an aluminium foil blanket that he thought was a pressure bandage, 
and no trauma kit. 
The investigators determined that demining was not being conducted in line with the demining 
group's SOPs and identified the following (quoted verbatim) failings: 
i) "The deminers were clearing a two metre wide lane. 
ii) They were working without lane markings. 
iii) The No.2 and the Section LEader were too close to the working No.1. 
iv) The deminers involved were not using a mine-detector without good reason. 
v) The deminers were not able to use the prodder correctly due to the hardness of the earth.  
vi) The demining was being carried out too quickly (1.3 metres per minute). 
vii) When the No.2 walked into the cleared lane he did not observe the safety distance 
between himself and the No.1.  
viii) [Demining group] SOPs contain a paragraph that instructs staff to refuse to work [if] they 
are ordered to carry out a task that does not comply with [Demining group] safety regulations. 




The investigators concluded that "the actions and lack of action of the Section Leader are 
considered to be both neglectful and constitute gross misconduct…he bullied them into 
disobeying…SOPs". Safety equipment did not help because "the explosion was relatively 
small". Alcohol had affected the actions of the Section Leader. There was not good reason for 
failing to use a metal detector and the hardness of the ground made the use of a prodder 
"correctly" impossible. Demining was being carried out "too quickly". 
There was a "high infestation of flies" that became "almost unbearable".  "This may well have 
contributed to the clearance methods and the speed of the demining operation." The 
Operations Room did not keep a log after communication was established. The first aid kit 
was "inadequate". They concluded that "had the casualty sustained more serious injuries it is 




The investigators recommended that staff must refuse to obey an order that breaches SOPs 
and that when a Supervisor cannot easily get to a demining location, work must stop. They 
further recommended that the demining group must stop all demining until they have 
adequate paramedic supplies and that no demining should take place without adequate 
communications. Other recommendations included that the Supervisors and Section Leaders 
should report breaches of SOP immediately, that the group should carry out refresher courses 
for all staff, including paramedics, and  should also "formulate and implement" training 
courses for supervisors and section leaders. They added that the Section Leader involved in 
the accident must be disciplined. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 75 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 40 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet, 
Short visor 
 





Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 




No medical report was made available: see Accident report.  
The victim's injuries were considered light, from which I infer that his amputation was "below 
the knee".   
Minor hand and leg injuries were later reported by one of the group’s Technical Advisors. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
the unapproved actions of the field supervisor appear to have led directly to the accident. 
Responsibility for the selection, training and control of field supervisors lies higher in the 
management chain. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training” because the 
supervisor appears not to have known how to do his job. 
The accident report illustrates several management failings that could have had far-reaching 
consequences if the accident has involved a larger device. The demining group involved was 
a specialist NGO of long-standing, making it hard to excuse the compound management 
errors exhibited in this accident. 
The time lapse between the accident and its investigation and the failure to record any 
attempt to identify the device are failures of the country MAC's investigation procedure that 
are not explained. 
 
Related papers 
A letter from the country MAC to the demining group was on file. It recorded an agreement for 
the demining group to increase "immediately" safety distances from 20 to 25 meters, increase 
the "soak-time" after a "mis-fire" from 10 to 30 minutes, and other (unspecified) minor SOP 
changes.  
In this letter it was noted that the demining group did carry out refresher courses for 
paramedics, but not deminers. The letter ended with the recorded opinion that the demining 
groups'  "demining operations are carried out in a professional manner and are to a high 
overall standard".  
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